![Optimal liquidation strategies and their implications [An article from: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control]](http://ecx.images-amazon.com/images/I/51S8Q075X2L.jpg)
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This digital document is a journal article from Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, published by Elsevier in 2007. The article is delivered in HTML format and is available in your Amazon.com Media Library immediately after purchase. You can view it with any web browser.
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This paper studies optimal liquidation when the selling price depends on the rate of liquidation, transaction time, volume, and the asset’s intrinsic value. A generic closed-form solution for maximizing the discounted liquidation proceeds is derived. To obtain financial insights, three parametric specifications that proxy for increasingly realistic market conditions are examined. In our framework, maximizing liquidation proceeds and minimizing liquidity costs are equivalent. The optimal strategies imply more rapid liquidations in less liquid markets. We also show that volatility is stochastic when market liquidity is unpredictable.
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![Investment and liquidation in renegotiation-proof contracts with moral hazard [An article from: Journal of Monetary Economics]](http://ecx.images-amazon.com/images/I/51K8KTFCWEL.jpg)
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This digital document is a journal article from Journal of Monetary Economics, published by Elsevier in 2004. The article is delivered in HTML format and is available in your Amazon.com Media Library immediately after purchase. You can view it with any web browser.
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In a long-term contract with moral hazard, the liquidation of the firm can arise as the outcome of the optimal contract. However, if the future production capability or market opportunities remain unchanged, liquidation may not be free from renegotiation. Will the firm ever be liquidated if we allow for renegotiation? This paper shows that the firm can still be liquidated even though liquidation is not free from renegotiation in the long-term contract. In addition to liquidation, the renegotiation-proof contract generates important features of the investment behavior and dynamics of firms observed in the data.
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![IPOs, trade sales and liquidations: Modelling venture capital exits using survival analysis [An article from: Journal of Banking and Finance]](http://ecx.images-amazon.com/images/I/51ETCKXBK9L.jpg)
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This digital document is a journal article from Journal of Banking and Finance, published by Elsevier in 2007. The article is delivered in HTML format and is available in your Amazon.com Media Library immediately after purchase. You can view it with any web browser.
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This paper examines the dynamics of exit options for US venture capital funds. Using a sample of more than 20,000 investment rounds, we analyze the time to ‘IPO’, ‘trade sale’ and ‘liquidation’ for 6000 VC-backed firms. We model these exit times using competing risks models, which allow for a joint analysis of exit type and exit timing. The hazard rate for IPOs are clearly non-monotonic with respect to time. As time flows, VC-backed firms first exhibit an increased likelihood of exiting to an IPO. However, after having reached a plateau, non-exited investments have fewer possibilities of IPO exits as time increases. This sharply contrasts with trade sale exits, where the hazard rate is less time-varying. We further provide evidence on the impact of economic factors such as syndicate size and composition, geographical location and VC value adding, on exit outcomes.
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![Dividends, safety and liquidation when liabilities are long-term and stochastic [An article from: European Economic Review]](http://ecx.images-amazon.com/images/I/41R2VE9R8VL.jpg)
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This digital document is a journal article from European Economic Review, published by Elsevier in 2004. The article is delivered in HTML format and is available in your Amazon.com Media Library immediately after purchase. You can view it with any web browser.
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This paper investigates the optimal management of a firm faced with a long-term liability that occurs at a random date. Three issues are analysed: The optimal dividend policy; optimal expenditure on safety to delay the occurrence of the liability; and the optimal liquidation date of the firm. An owner faced with dynamic unlimited liability never liquidates and therefore accumulates capital to the golden rule level. For long-term liabilities, dividend payments and safety expenditure are non-decreasing over time. The owner protected by limited liability may liquidate the firm in finite time in order to avoid paying the liability. If this is the case, then it accumulates less capital than the dynamic unlimited liability owner; and may decrease dividend payments and safety expenditure over time. The paper shows that a finite liquidation date is more likely to be optimal when the arrival rate of the liability occurrence increases over time.
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![Provisional liquidation of futures hedge programs [An article from: Energy Economics]](http://ecx.images-amazon.com/images/I/51XE4H7KWXL.jpg)
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This digital document is a journal article from Energy Economics, published by Elsevier in . The article is delivered in HTML format and is available in your Amazon.com Media Library immediately after purchase. You can view it with any web browser.
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Frequently a firm sets a capital allowance for its risk management program such that early liquidation is dictated when the loss from the derivative position exceeds the allowance. Using a two-period framework, we show that the early liquidation decision is supported when futures returns exhibit positive first-order autocorrelation. An empirical study concerning natural gas acquisition of a local distribution company (LDC) demonstrates possibilities of early liquidation underlying optimal hedge policies.
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This digital document is a journal article from Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, published by Elsevier in . The article is delivered in HTML format and is available in your Amazon.com Media Library immediately after purchase. You can view it with any web browser.
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We consider a securities market with bid-ask spreads at any period, including liquidation. Although the minimum-cost super-replication problem is non-linear, we introduce an auxiliary problem that allows us to characterize no-arbitrage via linear programming techniques. We introduce the notion of effective new security and show that effectiveness restricts the no-arbitrage bid and ask prices of a new security to the interval defined by the minimum-cost problem. We discuss in detail the cases in which the boundaries of this interval can be reached without violating no-arbitrage.
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![Does bank liquidation affect client firm performance? Evidence from a bank failure in Japan [An article from: Economics Letters]](http://ecx.images-amazon.com/images/I/51QYS7E08SL.jpg)
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This digital document is a journal article from Economics Letters, published by Elsevier in . The article is delivered in HTML format and is available in your Amazon.com Media Library immediately after purchase. You can view it with any web browser.
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Several empirical studies have concluded that bank failures have negative effects on client firms. By examining a Japanese main bank failure, this paper shows that the magnitude of negative effects depends on the clients’ characteristics and liquidation procedure.
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![Prospect theory and liquidation decisions [An article from: Journal of Economic Theory]](http://ecx.images-amazon.com/images/I/41S14MH1ATL.jpg)
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This digital document is a journal article from Journal of Economic Theory, published by Elsevier in 2006. The article is delivered in HTML format and is available in your Amazon.com Media Library immediately after purchase. You can view it with any web browser.
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We solve a liquidation problem for an agent with preferences consistent with the prospect theory of Kahneman and Tversky [Econometrica 47 (1979) 263-291]. We find that the agent is willing to hold a risky project with a relatively inferior Sharpe ratio if the project is currently making losses, and intends to liquidate it when it breaks even. On the other hand, the agent may liquidate a project with a relatively superior Sharpe ratio if its current profits rise or drop to the break-even point. Our results capture the spirit of the disposition effect and the break-even effect documented in empirical and experimental studies.
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![Bond elasticity under liquidation risk [An article from: Research in International Business and Finance]](http://ecx.images-amazon.com/images/I/51G5A5ETH1L.jpg)
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This digital document is a journal article from Research in International Business and Finance, published by Elsevier in . The article is delivered in HTML format and is available in your Amazon.com Media Library immediately after purchase. You can view it with any web browser.
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We derive a model for the valuation of government bonds subject to liquidation risk. We show that the value of a government bond depends on the term structures of the conditional probability of liquidation facing the portfolio manager, the bid-ask spread, and the riskless rate. We derive an expression for the elasticity of a government bond adjusted for the risk of liquidation with respect to shifts in the riskless term structure of interest rates. Failing to adjust elasticity for liquidation risk may be costly for bond portfolio managers utilizing active, rate-anticipation duration strategies based on Macaulay duration.
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![The disciplinary role of debt and equity contracts: Theory and tests [An article from: Journal of Financial Intermediation]](http://ecx.images-amazon.com/images/I/51Z04HXRP1L.jpg)
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This digital document is a journal article from Journal of Financial Intermediation, published by Elsevier in 2006. The article is delivered in HTML format and is available in your Amazon.com Media Library immediately after purchase. You can view it with any web browser.
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We study how equity and debt contracts commit investors to discipline managers. Our model shows that the optimal allocation of debt, equity, and control rights depends on which disciplinary action is more efficient. When the efficient action is managerial replacement, then control rights should be allocated to equity holders, and capital structure should consist of equity and long-term debt. When the efficient action is liquidation, then control rights can be allocated to the manager, and capital structure should consist of equity and short-term debt. We find empirical support to the model’s predictions in a sample of leveraged buyout transactions.
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